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NOTES
A STATE SOVEREIGNTY LIMITATION ON THE COMMERCE POWER
The National League of Cities and individual cities and states i sued
the Secretary of Labor testing the validity of the 1974 amendments to the
Fair Labor Standards Act,3 which extended the FLSA minimum wage and
maximum hour provisions to most state and local employees. The United
States Supreme Court held that the amendments were unconstitutional as a
violation of state sovereignty protected by the tenth amendment. The
National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
The congressional commerce power,' historically the subject of great
controversy, 6 has been given an increasingly broad interpretation since the
1930's.7 For example, in Maryland v. Wirtz,8 the Supreme Court upheld
the 1961 amendments9 to the FLSA, which extended the Act's minimum
1. The instant case represents two suits which were consolidated on appeal.
The plaintiffs in the original suits included the National League of Cities, the
National Governors' Conference, 19 states and four municipal governments.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 202-08, 210, 212-14, 216, 255, 260, 621, 630, 633a, 634 (Supp.
IV 1974).
3. Id. §§ 201 et seq. (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
4. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion which was joined by four
other Justices. Justice Blackmun joined this opinion but also wrote a separate
concurrence. Justice Brennan wrote a dissent for himself and Justices White
and Marshall. Justice Stevens dissented separately.
5. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
6. The controversy surrounding the commerce clause has arisen from at-
tempts to place some meaningful limit on the congressional power to regulate
commerce. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion would seem to give an extremely liberal scope to the commerce
power. See F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 15-40 (1937). This expansive
reading of the commerce clause was not always followed by the Court in the
early 1900's. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National
Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1946).
7. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936); Stern, The Commerce
Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 271,
284 (1973); Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946,
Part Two, 59 HARV. L. REV. 883, 947 (1946). The commerce clause has been given
an expanded intepretation in other areas as well. See, e.g., Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (civil rights); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(agriculture).
8. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
9. Pub. L. No. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65 (codified in scattered sections of Titles 8 and
29 of the U.S.C.).
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wage and maximum hour limitations to all employees of an "enterprise"
engaged in interstate commerce even where an individual employee's job
has no direct connection with interstate commerce." ° The 1974 amend-
ments extended the crucial "enterprise" coverage to include the activities
of states and their political subdivisions," and specifically included "pub-
lic agency" in the definition of "employer." 2
Congressional assertions of the commerce power that encroached on
areas traditionally regulated or controlled by the states have occasionally
been challenged for violating state sovereignty.' 3 The imposition of en-
vironmental regulations on the states is a recent example.14 In District of
Columbia v. Train,' 5 the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 were
successfully attacked;' 6 the District of Columbia Circuit found that forcing
the states to adhere to the congressional regulations infringed on their
position in the federal system.' 7
However, such "state sovereignty" attacks on the exercise of con-
gressional power are rarely successful.' 8 An exception to this general rule
once existed in the area of taxation. Beginning shortly after the Civil War,
a number of cases acknowledged a fairly broad state immunity from any
form of federal taxation;' 9 state employees were even immune from
10. "Enterprise" is defined in FLSA § 203 (r) (1974) as "the related activities
performed (either through unified operation or common control) by any person
or persons for a common business purpose."
I1. 29 U.S.C. § 203 (s) (5) (1974).
12. Id. § 203 (d).
13. See note 6, supra.
14. See The Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1970).
15. 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 426 U.S. 904 (1976) (Nos.
75-1050 and 75-1055), noted in 29 VAND. L. REV. 276 (1976).
16. Although the court upheld those portions of the statute which required
the states to provide "bus lanes" and to create bicycle paths, etc., it struck down
the portions of the statute which went beyond "regulation" and coerced the
states into enacting the regulations approved by the EPA Administrator. See
note 17, infra.
17. The court found that the EPA Administrator "cannot against a state's
wishes compel it to become involved in administering the details of the regulatory
scheme promulgated by the Administrator. For example, the attempt to
require the state to 'establish' each of the retrofit programs and to 'evaluate and
approve devices for use in this program' . .. , is an impermissible encroachment
on state sovereignty." 521 F.2d 971, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 426 U.S.
904 (1976). But see Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974) (where an
almost identical argument was rejected).
18. See note 7, supra.
19. Although Chief Justice Marshall, in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819), intimated that state governments would not be entitled to a
reciprocal immunity from federal taxation, later cases did in fact acknowledge
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federal income tax.2" More recent cases found an immunity from federal
taxation only for the states' traditional governmental functions. 2 When a
state engaged in "private" or "proprietary" activities, such as selling
liquor 22 or bottling mineral water, 23 it waived its immunity. Even this
limited immunity is now uncertain, however, because the distinction
between governmental and proprietary activities of a state has been largely
discredited.24 In the taxation area, therefore, the concept of state
sovereignty provides immunity only, if at all, when the state is engaged in
essential governmental functions.
Cases in which state sovereignty has been used to limit the taxing
power, the commerce power, or other express or implied congressional
powers, have generally relied on either the Constitution's scheme of
granted and reserved powers 25 or the eleventh amendment. 26 Article 1,
Section 8, which prohibits Congress from acting outside of its enumerated
powers, has provided the most important limitation on the exercise of
such an immunity. See, e.g., Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869). See
generally Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV.
L. REV. 633 (1945).
20. See Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871). But see Helvering v.
Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938) (specifically disallowing the state employees' im-
munity from federal income tax).
21. See, e.g., South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905). See gener-
ally Powell, The Remnant of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L.
REV. 757 (1945).
22. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
23. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
24. See id. (Justice Frankfurter's separate opinion would uphold any tax on
state activities which does not actually discriminate against the state). Accord,
United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946); Case v. Bowles, 327
U.S. 92, 101 (1945). But cf. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 30-31 (1953);
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938) (both of which seem to retain the
distinction).
25. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
26. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The eleventh amendment has been
argued as a limitation on the commerce power in several recent cases. See, e.g.,
Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Missouri, 411 U.S. 279
(1973); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). In Parden, however, the state
was deemed to have waived its immunity from suit in federal court by operating
a "private" railway. See Note, 17 VILL. L. REV. 713 (1972). See generally Nowak,
The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against the
State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975).
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congressional power. Such cases as United States v. Butler 27 and Carter
v. Carter Coal Co. 28 invalidated federal enactments because they failed to
come within the scope of the congressional commerce power, not because
the legislation violated state sovereignty. Besides these more traditional
restrictions of federal power, the tenth amendment has in recent years been
acknowledged as a further constitutional expression of state sovereignty.29
The tenth amendment has been generally ignored or belittled since its
adoption in 1791.30 When in 1937 the Supreme Court dismissed the
amendment as merely a "truism," it seemed clear that it would never have
a significant role in limiting the exercise of federal power. 3 1 However,
recent cases have evidenced a new respect for the tenth amendment. For
example, the Court noted in Fry v. United States:31
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a 'truism'
.it is not without significance. The Amendment expressly -de-
clares the Constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to
function in a federal system. 33
In the instant case there was no serious contention that the commerce
clause could not reach the activity sought to be regulated by the 1974
amendments to the FLSA, 34 but the Supreme Court nevertheless struck
down the amendments as a violation of the sovereignty of individual
states. The concept of state sovereignty that the Court found embodied in
the tenth amendment operates as an affirmative bar to even a valid exercise
of the commerce clause. In reaching this conclusion, the Court analogized
the tenth amendment concept of state sovereignty to the sixth amendment
right to trial and the due process clause of the fifth amendment, both of
which have previously been used to limit the commerce power. 35
27. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
28. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
29. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited to it by the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
30. But see Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (where an affirmative state
sovereignty argument did provide the rule of decision).
31. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1937).
32. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
33. Id. at 547.
34. Although the instant case overrules Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183
(1968), it is clear that the Court did not intend to limit the enterprise coverage of
the FLSA insofar as it affected the private sector. See the text at notes 8-12,
supra.
35. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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Much of the majority opinion discussed the extent of the intrusion
into state activities which would result if the amendments were enforced.
The Court emphasized that the amendments would not only require great
expenditure of state funds but would also force a reduction of state
services in a number of important areas.36 The majority asserted that the
states' power to decide how much will be paid to employees carrying out
governmental functions is essential to the states' "separate and indepen-
dent existence."-3 7 As a result, the amendments were held to be such a
radical curtailment of integral state activities that their enforcement would
upset the federal system.
The underlying theme of Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion seems
to be that at some point federal intrusion into the affairs of state govern-
ments violates the sovereignty of the individual states, the concept of a
federal system, and the spirit of the constitutional scheme. If some such
limitation on the exercise of federal power is to be enforced by the
judiciary, it is important to determine the point at which congressional
intrusion into the affairs of state governments violates their sovereignty.
In attempting to define this point, the Court in the instant case offered
no conclusive rule. The only guide suggested by the majority opinion, a
test derived from the taxation cases, is that state sovereignty will be a
defense against congressional power which impinges on "functions essen-
tial to [a ,tate's] separate and independent existence." 38 Such a test
arguably reinstates the questionable distinction made in the taxation cases
between "governmental" and "proprietary" state activities; 39 and, as in
the taxation cases, the difficulty of determining what constitutes an "es-
sential governmental function" and what constitutes merely a state-owned
business seems unavoidable.4 °
36. For example, the majority found that California and several
municipalities would be forced to reduce their police training programs in order
to comply with the minimum wage provisions. 96 S. Ct. 2465, 2472 (1976).
37. Id. at 2471.
38. Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869).
39. The distinction between governmental and proprietary activities is most
clearly expressed in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905). The
same distinction has also been important in some recent eleventh amendment
cases. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (where the state-owned
railroad was not a traditional governmental activity and was therefore not
immune from suit in federal court).
40. E.g., Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101 (1945): "[Tlhe petitioner's argument
is that the extent of [congressional war] power as applied to state functions
depends on whether these are 'essential' to the state government. The use of the
same criterion in measuring the constitutional power of Congress to tax has
1977]
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A determination that the regulated state activity is an "essential
governmental function" does not necessarily mean, however, that the
sovereignty of the state has been sufficiently offended to invalidate the
federal regulation. A further inquiry must be made into the extent of the
federal intrusion. This is clear from the Court's discussion of Fry v. United
States,41 which upheld the Economic Stabilization Act 42 and authorized
the imposition of wage "freezes" on state employees. Clearly the con-
gressional action in Fry affected the very same "essential governmental
functions" that were involved in the instant case. Nevertheless Fry was
distinguished because it was an "emergency measure' 43 and the means of
control were so drafted as to minimize interference with state functions."4
Thus, although the same state functions were affected, the extent of
federal intrusion was different. 45
The instant case also raises questions basic to the federal system. The
Court's opinion does not merely limit the breadth of a granted congres-
sional power, but rather recognizes an affirmative bar, in favor of the
states, to the exercise of what would otherwise be a valid power. Assum-
ing that it is desirable to restrain national intervention into state activities,
is the federal judiciary the proper institution to enforce this restraint? 46
Once Congress has enacted legislation under a valid power should not the
Court acquiesce to its political judgment? 47 The dissent in the instant case
proven to be unworkable, and we reject it as a guide in the field here involved."
See also the cases cited in note 24, supra.
41. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
42. 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1970). The Act authorizes the President to stablize or
"freeze" wages and salaries of employees in either the private or public sector.
43. 96 S. Ct. at 2474-75.
44. Justice Rehnquist points out that the wage freeze was in force for only a
"very limited, specific period of time," and it required no affirmative state
action. Id. at 2474.
45. In light of the Court's discussion of Fry, it seems clear that Congress
could still enact legislation which significantly affects essential functions of
state governments provided that the legislation was enacted in response to some
serious and pressing national problem and its interference with state governments
was limited. Congress might thus be able to achieve the same legislative
goals sought to be implemented in the 1974 amendments to the FLSA if the
substandard wages paid to state employees were found to constitute a serious
national dilemma and if the requirements imposed on the states were to expire
after a limited period of time.
46. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 45 and 46 (J. Madison); Freund, Umpiring the
Federal System, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 561 (1954).
47. See A. MACMAHON, FEDERALISM: MATURE AND EMERGENT 137-56, 177-232
(1955); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLum. L.
Rev. 543 (1954).
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was highly critical of what it considered a "restructuring" of the federal
system. 48 Justice Brennan's opinion asserts that the states have ample
political power to guard against intrusion by the federal government.
In The National League of Cities v. Usery the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional an exercise of the congressional commerce pow-
er because, in the Court's judgment, the legislation offended the
sovereignty of the states. If, in future cases, the Court strikes down
congressional legislation in the name of protecting the federal system, then
the tenth amendment may emerge as a hurdle for any congressional
enactment which would restrict or coerce state action. 49 Any such deci-
sions should define with greater clarity the character and extent of the
tenth amendment limitation.
Richard Curry
DUE PROCESS AND THE UNIVERSITY STUDENT: THE
ACADEMIC/DISCIPLINARY DICHOTOMY
Because of the unique status of the university student, expulsion from
a university raises serious constitutional problems; the courts in this area
face the difficult task of affording the student certain basic constitutional
guarantees without excessively intruding into academic affairs. The flurry
of student activism in the last decade produced increased demands for
constitutional protection in the expulsion process, and the courts have as a
result gradually expanded the student's claim to substantive and procedur-
al due process. This note will attempt to outline the current posture of due
process in the university-student relationship as a realistic compromise
between the often competing interests of traditional judicial respect for
academic wisdom and evolving social attitudes.
48. 96 S. Ct. at 2485 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. The future application of the instant case may, however, be quite limited.
In footnote 17 of the majority opinion Justice Rehnquist specifically reserves
decision as to whether other congressional powers affecting the essential functions
of state governments will be subject to the tenth amendment limitation. Id.
at 2474 n.17. Justice Blackmun, the "swing" vote in the instant case, expressed
similar reservations in his concurrence: "I may misinterpret the Court's opinion,
but it seems to me that it adopts a balancing approach, and does not outlaw
federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where the federal
interest is demonstrably greater." Id. at 2476.
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